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Abstract 
Off-farm work is a common phenomenon among farm household members in industrialised 
nations. In Scotland, it is expected to grow partly due to Brexit induced uncertainty in 
agricultural policy and markets. Previous research has linked the phenomenon to farmers’ 
production choices with some research findings suggesting that it increases the uptake of low 
input intensity pro-environmental farming methods but the overall evidence is mixed. An 
understanding of the influence of the expected growth in off-farm work on farmer production 
choices and its impact on the intensity of input use is of interest given the increasing policy 
emphasis being given to supporting sustainable agricultural production methods.  Using 
Scotland’s Farm Accounts Survey data, we examine the determinants of off-farm work and 
investigate its effects on two measures of agricultural intensity namely fertiliser and crop 
protection expenditures per hectare. We find that tenanted farmers managing relatively small 
farms are more likely to be involved in off-farm work. We also find that farmers with very high 
levels of off-farm work are significantly less intensive in the use of fertilisers but there is no 
evidence of any impact of off-farm work on their intensity of use of crop protection products. 
It follows that an increase in the proportion of farmers with off-farm work brought about by 
Brexit may have the unintended (positive) consequence of reducing the intensity of inorganic 
fertiliser use in agriculture, thereby making the sector more environmentally sustainable.   
Keywords: Off-farm work; Fertiliser; Crop protection; Input intensity; Environment 
1 Introduction 
Participation in off-farm work is a common phenomenon among UK farm household members 
and may be set to increase as a result of Brexit induced uncertainty in agricultural policy and 
markets. Unlike other forms of farm income diversification, off-farm work requires little to no 
capital investment. For individual farmers, it is a way of using their under-exploited time and 
labour resource in ways that enhance their levels of farm and/or household incomes (see e.g. 
Hansson, Ferguson, Olofsson, & Rantamäki-Lahtinen, 2013; Olfert, 1992). Additional motives 
for off-farm work include reduction of income risk and uncertainty (see e.g. Barbieri & 
Mahoney, 2009; Hansson et al., 2013; Mishra & Goodwin, 1997; Northcote & Alonso, 2011), 
motives associated with lifestyle choices (see e.g. Barbieri & Mahoney, 2009; Hansson et al., 
2013; Northcote & Alonso, 2011; Vik & McElwee, 2011) and changes in societal attitudes 
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towards female participation in paid work (see e.g. Mishra, El-Osta, Morehart, Johnson, & 
Hopkins, 2002). At a (rural) community level, increased participation of farmers in off-farm 
jobs may lead to the development of (new) rural services, and, in turn, in-migration and rural 
economic growth. 
Previous studies have suggested that off-farm work directly influences farmers’ on-farm 
production choices and can have significant implications for the environment, farm output 
performance and efficiency. The mechanism through which this occurs has been debated. 
Smith (2002) suggests that the reduction in on-farm time associated with off-farm work inhibits 
adoption of time intensive pro-environment farming techniques such as integrated pest 
management, soil testing and precision farming. The result of this may be high input intensities 
and low on-farm efficiencies. Gasson (1988) on the other hand argues that income from off-
farm work can facilitate farmers’ adoption of pro-environment low input intensity farming 
practices. Production practices with high input intensities have been shown to damage wildlife 
and habitats, cause surface and groundwater pollution and other environmental damages (see 
e.g. Falconer, 1998; McLaughlin & Mineau, 1995; Skinner et al., 1997).  
In Scotland, as elsewhere, agricultural policy is increasingly focused on encouraging a shift 
from high input conventional agriculture to agricultural concepts such as ‘conservation 
agriculture’ (Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007), ‘agro-ecological intensification’ (Milder, Garbach, 
DeClerck, Driscoll, & Montenegro, 2012) and ‘sustainable intensification’ (Barnes, 2012; 
Pretty & Bharucha, 2014). These agricultural management concepts may have differences in 
the practices advocated, but all centre on the proposition that agriculture and the environment 
are co-dependant and a careful management of the two (e.g. through low agrochemical input 
intensities) leads to long term sustainability. The linkage between farmers’ degree of 
engagement in off-farm work and how that influences their on-farm production practices and 
the resultant effects of those practices on agricultural and environmental sustainability is 
therefore of considerable policy interest. If off-farm work encourages less intensive pro-
environment farming practices, then an increase in off farm work arising from Brexit would be 
complementary with post CAP UK agricultural policy encouraging pro-environmental 
practices. Otherwise, increase in off-farm work may have counterbalancing and negative 
implications for the environment. Further, it is important to understand the determinants of off-
farm work in order to facilitate better policy targeting of farmer cohorts.  
The aim of this paper is two-fold; to examine the determinants of off-farm work and to further 
investigate its effect on agrochemical input intensities and associated implications for the 
environment. We study a representative sample of Scotland’s farmers, with a focus on the 
farmer rather than the spouse or other household members. The decision to focus on the farmer 
is partly driven by data considerations, but is also consistent with the findings of other studies 
which observe that farmers have the greatest influence on farm production choices (see e.g. 
Coughenour & Swanson, 1983; Meyer & Lobao, 1997).  
The paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, the dual approach (i.e. 
examining first the determinants of off-farm work and second, its effects on input intensity) 
ensures a better understanding of the causes and consequences of off-farm work and the 
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implications for contemporary and future agricultural and rural development policy in 
Scotland. Second, the paper provides specific and contemporary evidence of the impact of off-
farm work on agricultural intensity in Scotland using recent available data on Scotland’s 
farmers. The evidence provided is timely against the backdrop of Brexit, and would potentially 
inform contemporary and future agricultural and rural development policy in Scotland. Third, 
the estimation procedure used to examine the determinants of off-farm work accounts for 
potential endogeneity between off-farm work and farm production decisions as failure to do so 
may cause bias in estimates. Endogeneity has been ignored in many previous papers.  
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on the determinants of 
off-farm work and its effects on farming intensities, performance and efficiency. In Section 3, 
we discuss the methodology used for our study. In Section 4, we introduce our data. Section 5 
presents our results and Section 6 concludes our paper with a discussion of the implications of 
our findings for agricultural and rural development policy in Scotland. 
2 Literature review 
Below, we summarise previous studies on off-farm work in relation to its determinants and 
effects on production intensity, farm output performance and efficiency. 
2.1 Determinants of off-farm work 
A wide range of approaches and disciplines have examined the determinants of off-farm work 
with many studies drawing from the theory of the farm household which allows the farm 
household to be explicitly modelled as an optimising unit, considering household time 
allocations for on-farm work, off-farm work, and leisure (see e.g. Becker & Becker, 2009; F. 
Ellis, 1993; Nakajima, 2012; Phimister, 1993; Singh, Squire, & Strauss, 1986). Key 
determinants of off-farm work include farm and/or household financial circumstances and the 
frequency and levels of agricultural subsidies received. Weersink, Nicholson, and Weerhewa 
(1998) for example find that dairy farm families in New York State and Ontario were 
significantly motivated by their financial circumstances to engage in off-farm work. Ahearn, 
El-Osta, and Dewbre (2006) and Mishra and Goodwin (1997) on the other hand find that 
amongst US farmers, the additional income provided by farm subsidies reduced the need for 
farmers to engage in off-farm work. The opposite finding is reported by Hennessy and Rehman 
(2008) where it is shown that decoupled subsidy payments increased the incentive for Irish 
farmers to engage in off-farm work, suggesting that the influence may depend on the type of 
subsidy being provided. In contrast, government subsidies have been shown not to impact 
Dutch farmers’ off-farm work choices (see Woldehanna, Lansink, & Peerlings, 2000). 
Farmer characteristics (e.g. gender, age, marital status, education, experience), household 
demographics (e.g. presence of a spouse/partner, children) and farm spatial placement have 
also been evidenced to significantly determine farmers’ off-farm work choices. Goodwin and 
Mishra (2004) and Mishra and Goodwin (1997) for example show that where children are 
present, farmers are significantly less likely to engage in off-farm work. Ahituv and Kimhi 
(2006), Huffman (1980), Lien et al. (2006), Lien, Kumbhakar, and Hardaker (2010) and Serra, 
Goodwin, and Featherstone (2005) show that farmer individual characteristics significantly 
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determined off-farm work choice whilst Benjamin and Kimhi (2006) and Lass, Findeis, and 
Hallberg (1989) amongst others show that farm geographic placement in relation to adjoining 
towns and regions significantly determined farmers’ off-farm work choices. We consider, and 
where possible, include the above determinants in our estimation of the determinants of off-
farm work in Scotland. 
2.2 The effects of off-farm work on agricultural input use 
The effect of off-farm work on input intensity has been variously examined in the literature 
although the overall evidence is mixed. Smith (2002) hypothesised that increased off-farm 
work encourages adoption of time-saving farming practices involving high agrochemical input 
applications that harm the environment, and may have decreasing effect on farm performance 
and efficiency over the long run due to soil carbon and nutrient depletion. This hypothesis has 
been evidenced in the work of Phimister and Roberts (2006) who find that greater off-farm 
work participation significantly increased farmers’ use of pesticides and other agrochemicals 
intended for crop protection (but not fertiliser). Gasson (1988) however hypothesised that 
income from off-farm work can facilitate farmers’ adoption of farming practices with a focus 
on lower agrochemical input applications that benefit the environment, and may have 
increasing farm performance and efficiency effects over the long run due to soil carbon and 
nutrient gains. This hypothesis has been evidenced in Ellis, Heal, Dent, and Firbank (1999) 
who find amongst lowland farms in the Grampian region of Scotland that farmers engaged in 
off-farm work are likely to farm less intensively. Our purpose in this paper is to examine the 
effects of off-farm work on two measures of agrochemical input intensity i.e. fertiliser and crop 
protection inputs per hectare as these arguably have the greatest implications for agricultural 
and environmental sustainability. 
3 Methodology  
We use the Scottish Farm Accounts Survey (FAS) data which is collected annually under the 
EU Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) system (European Union, 2017). Our variable 
of interest is farmers’ ‘off-farm work hours’. Only about 7.53% of our sample observations 
involve positive off-farm work hours. ‘Off-farm work hours’ is therefore a limiting variable in 
the sense that it severely restricts the number of usable observations in our data. This limitation 
raises an econometric estimation issue known as the non-random sample selection problem, 
where only a small percentage of the population is selected or eligible for estimation due to the 
restrictions implied by the limiting variable. This problem can lead to biased and inconsistent 
results in some instances, but can be ignored in other instances. In instances where biased and 
inconsistent estimates result, sample selection corrections are required in order to make 
estimations unbiased, consistent and valid.  
3.1 Estimating the determinants of off-farm work 
In our first estimation procedure, we examine the determinants of off-farm work, where ‘off-
farm work hours’ is the dependent variable. Since the estimation sample is determined by the 
dependent variable in this case, the data restriction implied by this ‘limiting’ dependent variable 
raises an instance of ‘endogenous sample selection’ problem where sample selection bias and 
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inconsistency in estimates result unless sample selection corrections are effected (Wooldridge, 
2015). We use the sample selection correction procedure introduced by Wooldridge (2015) 
which adapts the methods of Heckman (1976) and Chamberlain (1982). This procedure 
accounts for any endogeneity between farm production choices and ‘off-farm work hours’. 
Many studies have ignored this issue, which as stated, may lead to bias (see Lass, Findeis, & 
Hallberg, 1991 for a review). The procedure also accounts for unobserved heterogeneity 
between farms. Let 𝑖 represent individual farms and 𝑡 represent time periods in our panel data. 
The sample selection model is presented as follows (Wooldridge, 2015);  
1. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ β + µ𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
2. 𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖
′𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where equation (1) is the main equation with 𝑦𝑖𝑡 being the dependent variable ‘off-farm work 
hours’, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  represents a vector of independent variables hypothesised to determine ‘off-farm 
work hours’, µ𝑖 represents time invariant farm and farmer characteristics, 𝑑𝑡 represents time 
period dummies and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 represents idiosyncratic errors. Equation (2) represents the participation 
equation where 𝑠𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable indicating whether or not a farmer participates in off-
farm work, 𝑧𝑖
′ represents a vector of independent variables also hypothesised to determine off-
farm work hours and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 represents idiosyncratic errors. To account for exclusion restrictions, 
the vector of independent variables in the main equation 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′   is made a strict subset of the vector 
of independent variables for the selection equation 𝑧𝑖
′, where the extra variables in 𝑧𝑖
′ are strictly 
exogenous. Consistent with the literature, we include, as appropriate and where available in 
our data, variables characterising farm and farmers’ characteristics and financial indicators in 
both vectors 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′   and 𝑧𝑖
′.  
Let 𝑛 represent the total sample of observations of off-farm workers (i.e. where off-farm work 
hours greater than zero) and non-off-farm workers (i.e. where off-farm work hours is zero). 
The two step sample selection correction procedure introduced by Wooldridge (2015) is 
conducted as follows. In step 1, all 𝑛 observations are used to estimate the participation 
equation by Probit estimator for each period. Mills ratios for each period are then generated. In 
step 2, the main equation is estimated using the sample of off-farm workers only. The 
estimation is by a pooled (robust) ordinary least squares estimator with the estimated Mills 
ratios included as independent variables.  
Due to the severe restriction of the sample for step 2, a parsimonious specification is preferred. 
We therefore include in the vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  variables capturing farmer age, land tenure, farm size, 
labour units, farm net worth and levels of subsidies received. We also include time dummies 
𝑑𝑡 to capture the effects of macroeconomic shocks that uniformly affects all farms e.g. 
changing relative prices (see e.g. Gilchrist & Himmelberg, 1995; Phimister & Roberts, 2006), 
as well as the Mills ratios formed in Step 1.  In vector 𝑧𝑖
′ for estimation of the selection equation 
in step 1, we include the variables in 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′   (excluding the Mills ratios) and additional variables 
capturing farms’ less favoured area status, whether or not they are arable and whether or not 
they are low-ground farms. These additional variables account for exclusion restrictions. 
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3.2 Estimating the effects of off-farm work on agrochemical input intensity 
In our second estimation procedure, we examine the effects of off-farm work on the intensity 
of agrochemical input use, specifically ‘fertiliser expenditure per hectare’ and ‘crop protection 
expenditure per hectare’. These two indicators of agricultural intensity are the dependent 
variables and are observed for most farms. The limiting variable ‘off-farm work hours’ is 
included as an independent variable. In this instance however, the data restrictions arising from 
the inclusion of the limiting variable ‘off-farm work hours’ as an independent variable does 
not cause sample selection bias or inconsistency in estimates. This is known as ‘exogenous 
sample selection’ (Wooldridge, 2015), where sample selection corrections are not required.  
Accordingly, we focus on use of linear panel data models of which some are more appropriate 
to our data and setting than others. Specifically, ours is an unbalanced short panel (i.e. many 
farms, few time periods), with the most appropriate models to consider being the ‘fixed-effects’ 
(FE) model and the ‘random-effects’ (RE) model. Consider the following generic model; 
3. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ β + α𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable ‘fertiliser expenditure per hectare’ or ‘crop protection 
expenditure per hectare’,  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  is a vector of independent variables (including ‘off-farm work 
hours’), α𝑖 are random individual specific effects and Ɛ𝑖𝑡 represents idiosyncratic errors.  The 
fundamental distinction between the FE and RE models lies in assumptions about the nature of 
the individual specific effects α𝑖 (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). 
In the FE model, a limited form of endogeneity is allowed by permitting α𝑖 to be correlated 
with the independent variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . The model decomposes to the following; 
4. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ β + α𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
5. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = α𝑖 + Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  is correlated with the α𝑖 of the composite error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 but not its idiosyncratic error 
term. Although it is possible to estimate the FE model by estimating α𝑖 for all farmers (in 
addition to the slope parameters β), asymptotic theory depends on large N and because N is 
large for short panels, this leads to an estimation of a large number of parameters, leading to 
the incidental parameters problem. To avoid this problem, a mathematical transformation of 
equation (3) is implemented by the FE estimator such that α𝑖 is absorbed by the intercept. The 
attraction of the FE model is its accommodation of the endogeneity arising from the correlation 
between 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  and α𝑖 (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Kohler & Kreuter, 2005).  
In the random effects model, α𝑖 is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the vector of 
independent variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ . This assumption is strong, with the inherent disadvantage of the RE 
model being that results may be inconsistent if the assumption is incorrect. The attraction of 
the RE model however is that it allows explicit estimation of the coefficients of α𝑖 (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2010; Kohler & Kreuter, 2005) such as farmer and farm characteristics for which 
we want an indication of effect on production intensity. The RE model is also preferred in 
instances where it is believed that α𝑖 differences across farms have direct influence on the 
dependent variable (Torres-Reyna, 2007). α𝑖 (e.g. geographic location/region of farm) has 
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indeed been empirically evidenced to impact farmer production choices and outcomes (Lien et 
al., 2010). RE models are also more appropriate in instances where within cluster variation is 
minimal and/or time varying variables are slow changing over time (Torres-Reyna, 2007), both 
of which are features of our data for our key variables ‘off-farm work hours’, ‘fertiliser 
expenditure per hectare’ and ‘crop protection expenditure per hectare’. Finally, empirical 
evidence shows that ‘off-farm work hours’ are not endogenous with some indicators of 
production intensity including ‘fertiliser expenditure per ha’ (Phimister & Roberts, 2006) in 
which case use of RE models provide consistent estimates. Given these observations and data 
considerations, we use the RE model for our estimations of the effect of off-farm work hours 
on agrochemical input intensity.   
4  Data 
We use the FAS data which contains an annual sample of about 500 farms that are 
representative of commercial farms in Scotland; and provides information on inputs, outputs 
and socio-economic data on the surveyed farms. Data is collected annually under the EU FADN 
quality guidelines, allowing for long term analysis of changes and trends in Scotland’s 
agriculture. Due to attrition bias resulting from farms leaving the industry and/or undergoing 
significant restructuring, the data is unbalanced. However the level of attrition is low (Brien & 
Hennessy, 2006). To limit the influence of attrition bias and meet minimum considerations for 
our estimation models, we exclude farms that did not have at least 2 consecutive years within 
the data.  
Although the FAS data is available from 1989, the consistent collection of data on farmers’ 
‘off-farm work hours’ that is suitable for our estimation models have been collected since 2010 
only. We therefore limit our analysis to the 6 year period between 2010 and 2015. Only farms 
with full information on ‘off-farm work hours’ and fertiliser and crop protection expenditures 
within this period were retained for use in our estimations. As extreme outliers are common in 
ratio data, we follow convention to exclude those observations where fertiliser and crop 
protection expenditure intensities were above the 98th percentile (Abdul‐Salam & Phimister, 
2017; Gilchrist & Himmelberg, 1995; Phimister & Roberts, 2006). All expenditure data were 
deflated with relevant price indices so that changes reflect quantity rather than prices (Abdul‐
Salam & Phimister, 2017). Our final panel data consisted of 556 farms of which 43 farms were 
observed over 2 years, 35 farms over 3 years, 40 farms over 4 years, 36 farms over 5 years and 
402 farms over 6 years. The total number of observations in the panel was 2894, with 218 
observations for off-farm workers (i.e. 7.53%) and 2676 observations for non-off-farm 
workers. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the variables of interest in the final data 







Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables in final dataset 
  Zero off-farm hours Positive off-farm hours 
Off-farm hours   
Annual farmer off-farm hours                                      -                                       815.21  
0 hours 100%                                             -    
> 0 and ≤ 200 hours                                      -    32.57% 
> 200 and ≤ 1600 hours                                      -    46.33% 
> 1600 hours                                      -    21.10% 
   
Farmer characteristics   
Male 97.83% 98.62% 
Age                               57.51                                       52.48  
≤ 45 years 12.37% 22.02% 
> 45 and ≤ 65 years 63.04% 70.64% 
> 65 years 24.59% 7.34% 
Farm characteristics   
Owner occupied 44.62% 43.58% 
Small 34.87% 50.00% 
Medium 19.77% 16.97% 
Large 45.37% 33.03% 
Arable 23.36% 19.27% 
Mixed 14.99% 15.14% 
Low ground cattle and sheep 5.83% 4.13% 
LFA cattle and/or sheep 45.37% 57.34% 
Dairy 10.46% 4.13% 
Organic 3.10% 10.09% 
Area, ha 151.878 155.272 
Labour units 1.99 1.71 
Grazing livestock units 149.61 119.08 
Stocking density (livestock units per ha) 1.26 0.98 
Degree of livestock specialisation 0.74 0.74 
   
Farm finance   
Net worth, £                1,396,688.80                         1,246,107.56  
Total grants, £                      57,416.59                               56,793.79  
Total livestock revenues, £                    108,646.53                               87,907.19  
Total crop revenues, £                      61,580.89                               51,321.02  
   
Intensity   
Fertiliser expenditure, £ per ha                            145.64                                     114.55  
Pesticide expenditure, £ per ha                               37.84                                       31.47  
Number of observations 2676 218 




Average annual hours for farmers engaged in off-farm work is 815 hours, with 33% of these 
farmers doing up to 200 hours, 46% doing between 200-1600 hours and 21% doing over 1600 
hours. Consistent with previous studies including Lass et al. (1991) and Phimister and Roberts 
(2006),  farmers engaged in off-farm work tend to be younger and manage small farms. 
Conversely, a larger majority of non-off-farm workers (about 45%) manage large farms This 
is consistent with previous studies including Hill (1999) and Phimister and Roberts (2006). For 
livestock farmers the proportion of LFA cattle and/or sheep farmers engaged in off-farm work 
is greater. To the contrary the proportion of dairy and low-ground livestock farmers engaged 
in off-farm work is lower, consistent with the findings of Phimister and Roberts (2006) and 
indicative of the intensity of the higher labour demands of these farming types.  
Stocking density is a continuous variable, defined as the ratio of grazing livestock units to 
forage area. It is a proxy for the intensity of livestock production. The average stocking density 
for non-off-farm workers is significantly greater than that of off-farm workers, perhaps 
indicating that intensive production methods inhibit off-farm work. Degree of livestock 
specialisation is also a defined variable, calculated as the ratio of livestock revenues to total 
farm revenue (i.e. livestock and crops). Higher scores in this range indicate higher 
specialisation in livestock production rather than crop production, and vice versa. Finally, 
significant differences exist in fertiliser and crop protection expenditures for farms with and 
without off-farm work. Both fertiliser and crop protection expenditure intensities are higher on 
average in farms without off-farm work, which is consistent with our a priori conjecture about 
the relationship between off-farm work and production intensities. 
5 Results 
5.1 Determinants of off-farm work 
Table 2 shows our estimation results for the determinants of off-work, with the sample selection 
model in column 2 showing our base results. The sample selection result is closely reflected in 
signage by the robust OLS estimation in column 3 hence indicating the stability and robustness 
of our results. Age of farmer was expected, a priori, to be a significant determinant of off-farm 
work with negative signage so that increasing age reduced propensity for working off-farm. 
This would have reflected the hypothesis that younger farmers are more eager to do more work 
beyond the farm in order to expand their incomes and accumulate future wealth, in line with 
the life cycle hypothesis of Modigliani (1986). It would have also reflected the notion that age 
is a proxy for experience at least to the extent that farmers learn by doing, so that older more 
experienced farmers are more efficient at farm production hence have less need to supplement 
their incomes with off-farm work. However, the evidence shows that although age decreased 
propensity for off-farm work, the effect was not statistically significant amongst Scotland’s 
farmers. 
Land tenure is found to be a significant and negative determinant of farmers’ off-farm work 
participation choices. Compared to farmers who own their own land, tenant farmers are more 
likely to engage in off-farm work. The explanation could be that tenant farmers have higher 
motives for accumulating income hence have a greater propensity to engage in off-farm work. 
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Similar to land tenure, the area used for agriculture is a significant and negative determinant of 
farmers’ off-farm work choices. Farmers who manage larger farms are less likely to engage in 
off-farm work. This is consistent with the findings of Benjamin and Kimhi (2006), Lass et al. 
(1991), Mishra and Goodwin (1997) and Serra et al. (2005). The reason for this is somewhat 
related to the profit focus of larger commercial farms, where there is likely potential benefits 
in the form of returns to scale.  
As expected, our results also show that farmers managing more labour intense farms (i.e. family 
and hired labour, excluding farmer labour) are significantly less likely to engage in off-farm 
work. This is somewhat self-evident, as labour intense farms naturally inhibit farmer 
participation in non-off-farm activities. However, contrary to expectations we also find that 
farmers with higher net worth are significantly more likely to engage in off-farm work. One 
possible explanation for this is that such farmers are more efficient and hence are able to afford 
spare time for work off-farm. Another plausible explanation is that these farmers are more 
educated and hence are likely skilled in other higher paying sectors with demand for their 
labour. Given a higher marginal return for their labour in off-farm work, and given perfect 
substitution of their own-labour for hired-labour, they are able to work off-farm for the higher 
income. Although net worth and area used for agriculture might appear to be highly correlated, 
we find that their degree of correlation is less than 50% hence multicollinearity is unlikely to 
be an issue hence justifying their inclusions. Finally, our results show that government 
subsidies do not significantly determine Scotland’s farmers’ off-farm work choices. A priori, 
it was expected that higher (decoupled) CAP subsidies as received by Scotland’s farmers would 
likely increase their propensity for off-farm work, as evidenced by Hennessy and Rehman 
(2008) in a different setting. Although the signage is positive and consistent with this 
hypothesis, the lack of significance may be a consequence of the limited variability in the 
subsidies received by the farmers in our sample. Our findings with respect to subsidies is 
consistent with the findings of Lien et al. (2010) and Woldehanna et al. (2000), although it is 
at variance with the findings of Ahearn et al. (2006) and Mishra and Goodwin (1997). The 
insignificant Mills ratios suggest that sample selection is not a significant driver of the results. 
Compared to 2010, farmers were significantly less likely to engage in off-farm work in years 
2011-2013, perhaps hinting some period specific factors pertaining to those years.   
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Table 2: Determinants of off-farm work using a sample selection correction model, and an OLS model for robustness 
checks 
    Sample selection correction model Robust OLS model 
 log (age of farmer) -0.85 -1.22 
  (1.36) (1.23) 
 Tenure (owner = 1; tenanted = 0) -1.03** -0.74* 
  (0.49) (0.42) 
 log (area used for agriculture) -0.47*** -0.49*** 
  (0.16) (0.17) 
 log (labour units) -2.12*** -1.45*** 
  (0.60) (0.41) 
 log (net worth) 0.69** 0.51* 
  (0.30) (0.27) 
 log (subsidies received) 0.55 0.25 
















2011.period -0.78* -0.29* 
 (0.40) (0.17) 
2012.period -1.03** -0.14 
 (0.48) (0.24) 
2013.period -0.89* 0.03 
 (0.52) (0.26) 
2014.period -0.60 0.35 
 (0.55) (0.24) 
2015.period -1.23 -0.08 
 (0.79) (0.34) 
 Mills ratio (Period 1) -0.56  
  (0.57)  
 Mills ratio (Period 2) -0.27  
  (0.54)  
 Mills ratio (Period 3) -0.06  
  (0.58)  
 Mills ratio (Period 4) 0.01  
  (0.56)  
 Mills ratio (Period 5) 0.00  
  (0.45)  
 Mills ratio (Period 6) 0.15  
  (0.39)  
 Constant -1.52 4.47 
   (7.92) (6.87) 
 N 181 218 
 R-squared 0.34 0.26 
 AIC criterion 689.75 810.54 




5.2 The effects of off-farm work on agricultural input intensity 
The distribution of ‘off-farm work hours’ data is skewed and lumpy, in part due to the 
retrospective collection of the data from farmers making it subject to recall bias (Dex, 1995). 
To limit lumpy ‘off-farm work hours’ effects and recall bias, we follow Phimister and Roberts 
(2006) to cast ‘off-farm work hours’ as dummy variables capturing ranges of the extent of 
farmers’ off-farm work participation. Table 3 shows our estimation results for the effects of 
‘off-farm work hours’ on fertiliser and crop protection expenditure intensities. 
Our main interest in the results is the effects of off-farm work on fertiliser and crop protection 
expenditure intensities. The results show that farmers who annually work up to 1600 hours off-
farm are not significantly different from farmers who do not work off-farm in terms of their 
fertiliser and crop protection expenditure intensities. This is also true of farmers who work 
more than 1600 hours off-farm in terms of their crop protection expenditure intensities. For 
fertiliser expenditures however, farmers who work more than 1600 hours annually off-farm are 
significantly less intensive compared to farmers who do not work off-farm. This result is 
consistent with previous studies (see e.g. Davies & Dalton, 1993; Ellis et al., 1999; Gasson, 
1988; McNally, 2002; Phimister & Roberts, 2006). A plausible explanation for this effect is 
that for farmers who work significant hours off-farm (i.e. more than 1600 hours annually), farm 
management is simplified where the emphasis is on the use of lower time, labour and financial 
resources through lower fertiliser applications. Spending significantly more time off-farm 
therefore appears to facilitate a less intensive production regime. For farmers who do not work 
off-farm however, and for whom reliance is mostly on farm income, farm management may be 
more aimed towards maximisation of fertiliser input applications in order to maximise profits.   
Other results show that fertiliser and crop protection expenditure intensities are significantly 
higher on arable farms and on livestock farms with high stocking densities. In the case of arable 
farms, this is a natural consequence of higher use of agrochemicals for arable crop production 
than on livestock farms for grass production. In the case of livestock farms with high stocking 
densities, this is also expected due to greater use of techniques such as reseeding. Further, 
fertiliser and crop protection expenditure intensities are significantly higher on large net worth 
farms, farms receiving large amounts of subsidies and farms using greater labour inputs. On 
the contrary, fertiliser and crop protection expenditure intensities are significantly lower on 
owner occupied, organic and high specialisation farms. 
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Table 3: Effects of off-farm hours on fertiliser and crop protection expenditure intensity using a RE model 










Off-farm hours   
> 0 and ≤ 200 hours 0.01 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.14) 
> 200 and ≤ 1600 hours 0.01 -0.05 
 (0.06) (0.11) 
> 1600 hours -0.35** -0.30 











Age   
≤ 45 years 0.03 0.17** 
 (0.04) (0.08) 
> 45 and ≤ 65 years 0.04 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.06) 
 Owner occupied (Owner = 1) -0.06* -0.15** 
  (0.03) (0.06) 
 Organic (Organic = 1) -1.02*** -0.53*** 
  (0.08) (0.18) 
 Arable only 0.19*** 0.22*** 
  (0.05) (0.08) 
 Non grant improvements  (Yes = 1) 0.02 -0.05 
  (0.02) (0.03) 
 Stocking density 0.14*** 0.09*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) 
 Degree of specialisation -0.59*** -2.65*** 
  (0.07) (0.13) 
 Log (Area) -0.39*** -0.39*** 
  (0.03) (0.06) 
 Log (Labour units) 0.20*** 0.17** 
  (0.04) (0.07) 
 Log (net worth) 0.08*** 0.19*** 
  (0.02) (0.04) 
 Log (Subsidies and grants) 0.29*** 0.34*** 













2011.period -0.16*** -0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.04) 
2012.period -0.01 -0.08* 
 (0.02) (0.04) 
2013.period 0.06** -0.08 
 (0.03) (0.05) 
2014.period 0.08*** -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.05) 
2015.period 0.03 0.23*** 
 (0.03) (0.05) 
 Constant 2.77*** 0.09 
  (0.40) (0.79) 
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 Number of observations 2825.00 2537.00 
 R-squared   
 r2_o 0.47 0.58 
 r2_b 0.57 0.66 
 r2_w 0.10 0.03 
 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we used a dual study approach and recent Scotland data to first examine the 
determinants of off-farm work and second, its impact on agricultural input intensity, focusing 
on fertiliser and crop protection inputs. Focus on these inputs has implications for agricultural 
and environmental sustainability which are key policy goals in Scotland and the UK. The dual 
approach we use allows an understanding of the causes and consequences of the off-farm work 
phenomenon, providing timeous evidence for policy consideration as the UK prepares to exit 
the EU.   
In the first part of our dual study approach, we find that tenanted farmers managing relatively 
small farms with lower labour requirements are more likely to be engaged in off-farm work, as 
are farmers with higher levels of net worth. Tenanted farmers have a higher motive for wealth 
accumulation which perhaps explains their tendency for off-farm work. Farmers managing 
small farms with lower labour requirements may use off-farm work as a way of deploying their 
under-exploited time and labour resource in ways that enhance their levels of farm and/or 
household incomes. It is not clear why high net worth farmers are more likely to engage in off-
farm work. One possible explanation could be that these are highly educated farmers whose 
education allows them to find higher paying off-farm for which they substitute with family or 
hired on-farm labour. In the second part of our dual study approach, we find that farmer 
participation in off-farm work reduces intensity of fertiliser applications but not the use of crop 
protection products. This would imply that an increase in farmer participation in off-farm work 
may have the unintended (positive) consequence of reducing the intensity of inorganic fertiliser 
use in agriculture, thereby making the sector more environmentally sustainable. This would 
however possibly have adverse implications for agricultural output in the short run as inorganic 
fertiliser input is reduced, but possibly positive output implications in the long run as soil 
fertility and resilience is enhanced due to less inorganic fertiliser input intensity. 
Our findings have important implications for agricultural and rural development policies in 
Scotland and the UK. Most obviously, they suggest that the effect of an increase in the 
proportion of farmers uptaking off-farm work is consistent and complimentary with policies 
aiming for greater pro-environmental farming practices.  
Our analysis was limited by the lack of socio-economic variables in the data set and further 
qualitative research is required to understand better the factors which influence off farm work 
participation, off-farm work hours and the reasons why this then impacts fertiliser use but 
apparently not other agrochemical use. The panel dataset also allows analysis of transitions 
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